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THE ALLEGED RUSSIAN PLANS FOR THE INVASION OF AUSTRALIA, 
r864 
By DUNCAN MACCALLUM 
ALEXANDRA, arriving in the second week of November, r864, brought much important news from London in the mail that had left in September: the 
accounts of the Shakesperian Festival Committee at Stratford-on-Avon showed a 
deficiency of £5,000; there had been an unparalleled increase of brutal murders and 
other criminal offences; a frightful colliery explosion had occurred near North Shields, 
resulting in the death of eighteen persons; a fire had almost gutted the Haberdashers' 
Hall in Gresham Street, causing damage of about £roo,ooo; an earthquake shock 
had been distinctly felt in Cheshire; there had, in the week before the mail left, 
been a violent tempest, causing 47 ships to be wrecked; the Emperor of Abyssinia 
had kept the British Consul in irons because he delayed making a favourable reply 
to the Emperor's offer of marriage to Queen Victoria. But not the least interesting 
news to the colonists, in fact, what the Argus describedl as the most interesting 
news, was the revelation by The Times of what purported to be the great Russian 
project for the destruction of some of the Australian seaports. It appeared to the 
Argus that, for the past eight or nine months, the fate of the colony had hung by a 
thread. The story which The Times published,2 according to the Australasian, 
"with solemn authority ",3 was that information had reached it" in a very authentic 
shape" that Russia fully expected the breaking out of war as a result of her corres-
pondence in r863 with the English and French governments on the subject of Poland. 
Wishing to put her fleet to better use than that to which it had been put in the 
Crimean War (when it had been locked up in ports), Russia had noticed the tactics of 
the Confederates in the American Civil War, and had seen how much injury a very 
small force could inflict on a large and flourishing commerce. Even if the exploits 
of the Confederate ship, Alabama, were unusual, she thought that she might be able 
to strike a blow which would inflict a great discredit on English arms, and damage 
to her commerce. 
The Australian gold colonies were tempting baits and perhaps easy triumphs. 
Sir Charles Darling wrote that " the importance of Pt. Phillip as a harbour whence 
the Russian Fleet might inflict serious injury upon the Australian trade [which he 
estimated at about £50 millions per annum] ... is obvious ".4 
Russia was prepared, as The Times put it, to make a swoop even though she knew 
that her fleet might not long keep the seas against English and French forces. 
According to The Times, instructions had been issued to the Russian admirals on the 
American Californian coast, directing them to leave their ports to rendezvous and to 
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be ready in the event of a war with England to bear down on the Australian colonies, 
first on Melbourne, then on Hobart, then on Adelaide, Sydney and New Zealand. 
The circumstances in which Russia and England might have been at war in I864 
comprised, of course, the Polish Insurrection. The first article in the final act of the 
Treaty of Vienna had decreed Poland to be bound by its constitution to the Russian 
Empire and also contained an assurance on the part of the then Czar that the Poles 
should enjoy a National Representation and institutions of a liberal nature. Although 
the Emperor, Alexander II, had introduced a policy which Dr. Coleman has considered5 
as showing enlightened self-interest, his rule did not appear congenial to many of the 
Poles, and partly as the result of the activity of some parts of the Emigration, 
consisting of those who had left Poland after I830, partly as the result of the student 
activities and the Liberal movement within Poland and the outbreak of patriotic 
fervour in January, I863, the Polish Central National Committee called the nation 
to arms. Insurrection had become general by February, I863. 
In view of the dispositions in the Treaty of Vienna, it seemed significant when 
Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary in Lord Palmerston's cabinet, had 
recognized the belligerent rights of the Poles. This seemed to be tantamount to a 
surrender of the principle of non-intervention. But the unhappy retreat of the 
English Government, in spite of the personal sympathy of Lord Palmerston for the 
Poles, is a matter of history. In view of the roles of France and Prussia, Lord 
Palmerston found himself obliged to see that effective action was impossible, a view 
that was not uncongenial to Queen Victoria and to the, at first, pacifist, and then 
anti-Polish attitude of the Thunderer, The Times-an attitude perhaps largely due 
to the conjunction of activities of Count Brunow,6 the Russian Ambassador at the 
Court of St. James, Baron Lionel Rothschild, who had contracted a Russian loan of 
fifteen million pounds, and Delane, the Editor of The Times, with whom Baron 
Lionel was on very close terms of friendship. 
At any rate, the Australasian in October, I864, reported7 the execution of Poland 
after months of lingering agonies: " ... the bitter end has come. The final scenes 
are declared in August of one of the saddest tragedies of modern times." The 
Australian press were, so far as I have been able to ascertain, sympathetic to the 
Poles, aware of Russian expansionary tendencies8 and pessimistic about the European 
situation in I864. In July, I864, for instance, one paper had published9 its report 
from London in May. "The horizon darkens daily, a tempest is evidently at hand." 
The correspondent remarked that the English Government was draining the cup of 
humiliation to its bitterest dregs. He referred, for example, to the arrogance and 
rapacity of Prussia; to the duplicity and double-dealing of Russia; to the reserved 
and equivocal attitude of France; and to the clamours of the German democracy for 
the dismemberment of Denmark. 
If the Polish debacle was regarded, then, as complete by November, I864, there 
was much sympathy for bleeding Poland, and there was not any undue optimism as 
to the state of international relations. On the other hand, Australia was thousands 
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of miles from the seat of controversy. The main political matters agitating the 
Victorian people were the issues of Protection versus Free Trade, and the Land 
Question. This was the time of Ben Hall and his bushranging. A great deal of 
interest was being taken in the Molesworth divorce case involving Mr. Justice 
Molesworth, which, as the Melbourne Punch stated,lO revealed the" intense disgust 
of a highly moral public on being excluded from court while some highly immoral 
revelations were being made". The ramifications of the case in colonial society 
were profound, and the Argus was movedll to hope that it would not be accepted 
by English newspapers as a true picture of Victorian domestic life. One of the 
burning colonial issues that directly impinged on the reception of this news from the 
outside world was the controversy as to whether transportation to Western Australia 
should be continued. This had, in fact, become a large colonial question. "Not a 
single mail ", wrote the Argus,l2" had gone to England during the last eleven months 
without some petition or remonstrance, official or private, against the sending of 
convicts to Western Australia. Men of all shades of political opinion, of all professions 
and callings, of all creeds and sects, have taken part in the most righteous indignation." 
The Argus argued that this pollution of Australia's soil should be opposed by every 
lawful means and that, if the British Government persisted in its decision to send 
convicts to Western Australia, the policy would inevitably lead to estrangement 
from" the land at present the object of our loyal affections and allegiance ". 
Before we can examine the reactions in the colony to the Russian news that was 
available publicly first from the London Times arriving in November, we must 
examine the source of the information and the process by which it reached officialdom. 
Searching in the light of recent events,13 I can find no information to suggest that 
when he heard of the alleged Russian designs on Australia, the Leader of the Opposition 
in the Victorian Parliament, Mr. O'Shannassy, wrote to the Foreign Minister of Czarist 
Russia to ask him if there was anything in the report; in fact, in the colonies the 
matter was handled very discreetly.l4 
And this takes us back for a brief time to Russia and Poland. 
Admiral Popov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Station of the Russian 
Navy, had visited Melbourne and Sydney in early r863 in the course of a cruise, part 
of which, at any rate, was designed to secure the friendship of the American Federal 
Government, that is, the Northern Government, and to prepare to attack British 
commerce in the event of war. The Admiral was a naval ship designer of note; 
he had become quite famous by his breaking of the British blockade at Petropauloski, 
and he was now attached to the staff of His Majesty Alexander II.ls The awareness 
of a threat to English power that might be implied in Russian expansion did not 
prevent Popov being welcomed enthusiastically in the colonies. 
It was, of course, not the only experience of visiting Russian warships. At the 
beginning of r862 the Russian eagle, in the case of Swetlana, had visited Melbourne 
without fluttering the dovecots.ls "Nothing had been cracked ", wrote the Argus,17 
" but jokes and bottles. The only artillery practice witnessed was the popping of 
champagne corks and our boarding parties had been received by the Admiral, not 
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with hot shot and cold steel, but bon-bons and cheroots." The social qualities of 
the Russian gentleman and his peculiar capacity as a linguist were favourably noted 
by the Press, and in 1863 the Illustrated Melbourne Post described18 in detail Popov's 
corvette, Bogatyr, even to mentioning the cooking arrangements and the hangings 
in the Admiral's cabin. While the ship lay in Melbourne, Popov had thrown it-
except for the magazine--open to public inspection and probably nearly 8,000 people 
took advantage of this. When the Admiral visited Sydney, a mistake was made 
in returning his salute, which was remedied the next morning by firing the appropriate 
twenty-one guns. The Governor of New South Wales, Sir John Young, apologized, 
forwarding the explanations of the Commander of Her Majesty's Troops, which 
Popov was asked to return, as " owing to pressure of business copies have not been 
made". Popov accepted the explanations as perfectly satisfactory.1 9 The episode 
is an interesting example of the niceties and courtesies of service and international 
protocol. If looked at otherwise, it would seem ironical in view of the fact that 
Popov was the commander of the fleet which in certain eventualities was to attack 
some British possessions-probably Australian ports. According to Sir Charles 
Darling, who became Governor after Popov's visit, it was well known that during 
Bogatyr's visit the harbour of Port Phillip "was minutely surveyed by Russian 
officers, and I understand that a similar survey was made of W' estern Port". 20 
On board Bogatyr was a young Polish officer, whom I have called Zlyszuvski.21 
It was, of course, entirely proper for a Pole to be in the Russian Navy, since Poles 
owed allegiance to the Czar. In Melbourne also was Severin Apolinair Rakowski. * 
The resistance movement in Poland at the time of the Insurrection was controlled 
by the shadowy but influential Polish National Government, which preserved order, 
made laws, levied taxes, and commanded some support from the considerable number 
of Poles who had left their country after the unsuccessful rising of 1830. One of 
these was Rakowski, a count of noble family. I have not been able to verify all of 
the report of his career in Victorian Men of the Time, but it seems that after an 
adventurous escape after 1830 he went to England. Some years later he migrated 
to Victoria, where he was naturalized in August, 1854. He is supposed to have 
failed in a farming venture and then, after reverses in an importing business, he became 
employed as a bookkeeper and accountant. Rakowski died a natural death in July, 
1887, and was buried as a member of the Church of England in the Melbourne General 
Cemetery.22 
Rakowski had interested himself in Polish Relief. "On behalf of the old Polish 
soldiers in Melbourne ", he had written a letter to the Argus in December, 1863, 
appealing for help for the National Government. "Men of Israel-ye are the bulk 
* Since this address was delivered, Mr. L. K. Paszkowski, of Melbourne, who is investigating 
the history of Poles in Australia, has informed me that the name of this officer (whom I called X) 
as given in the Argus, October 15, 1863, p. 5, col. 3, is correct-Zbyszewski. Mr. Paszkowski 
has kindly translated extracts from Lepszy Kazimierz: DZIEJE FLOTY POLSKIEJ, Gdansk, 
1947 (The History of the Polish Navy), in which Ladislaus Zbyszewski's desertion is described. 
Under the assumed name of Felix Karp, he was appointed Organizer General of Polish National 
Naval Forces. The incident is also discussed in Pertek, Jerzy: POLACY NA SZLAKACH 
MORSKICH SWIATA, Gdansk, 1957 (Poles on the World Sea-Lanes). 
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of the Poles in Australia, ye are many and strong." This appeared with another 
letter addressed to "the Hebrew population in Australia, natives of Poland", 
following a sympathetic editorial.23 
In August, 1863, the Mayor of Melbourne convened a meeting in accordance 
with an influentially signed requisition to decide upon what the colonists could do to 
show their sympathy with Poland. More than 1,000 people filled St. George's Hall. 
One of the instigators of the meeting, Mr. Langlands, said he had heard many 
say these meetings were simply got up by Roman Catholics because the Poles as a 
nation were Catholic, but he was sure that there was no one present who shared in 
that opinion.24 Even had this been so, there was ample humanitarian reason for 
help and good work on behalf of the Poles. In fact, the membership of the committee 
and the speakers at the meeting suggest a wider non-sectarian interest, though the 
interest was not sustained in subsequent activity. It included Mr. Hull, a member 
of the Victorian Legislative Council, Edward Cohen, John Langlands and Charles 
Gavan Duffy. Dr. Cairns, the prominent Presbyterian minister, Dr. Embling, a 
medical practitioner, and the Reverend Mr. Rintel, the minister of the Jewish 
congregation in Melbourne, spoke, as well as Mr. Hull. A Pole who was present read 
a letter of encouragement he had received from Victor Hugo. A motion of sympathy 
was carried, and several subscriptions were reported as being received by the 
Treasurer, Mr. T. J. Sumner, who had apparently been elected Treasurer of this 
committee, later referred to as the "English committee". 25 
Some months later the Age wrote of this august committee, "nothing has been 
heard of its proceedings ... Will any of its members say whether it be dead or alive? " 
This opinion was shared by Rakowski, and the Poles decided to form their own 
organization.26 Towards the end of November, a number of Polish gentlemen met 
at Danoker's " Globe" Hotel, Swanston Street, Melbourne, to discuss ways in which 
they could demonstrate their practical sympathy with Poland, and, following broadly 
the organization of a corresponding committee at New York, they formed a committee 
to appeal for financial support and to work in conjunction with the "English 
committee", appointed in August. Rakowski did not preside nor at this stage was 
he a formal office-bearer, but he was asked as " agent for Poland" to address the 
meeting, and in fact he had nominated the Chairman. 
He stated that already eleven volunteers had been sent home by subscriptions, 
and some money was collected at the meeting. By March, 1864, £59 was reported 
by Rakowski to have been sent to the Earl of Harrowby, the President of the Literary 
Association of the Friends of Poland, the Bank of Victoria making its contribution 
by granting the draft at par.27 It is hard to assess the support for the Fund, as the 
Committee's figures do not identify the Poles and Polish Jews separately, * but the 
... According to the Age (November 27, 1863) the Christian Poles in Victoria were very few, 
" but Poles of the Jewish persuasion are settled very numerously throughout all the Australias ". 
The Age appealed to Jews for support, but also argued that mankind in general had reason to be 
grateful to Poland. "As we cannot send from Australia a legion of fighting men, let us send at 
least the means of arming one, for arms are the things needful in this contest." 
(footnote continued on page 48) 
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Victorian people were about this time also contributing generously to an Irish Relief 
Fund.28 
The historian's task is not made any easier by the probability that false names 
were assumed in this incident. At this meeting, someone remarked29 on the desir-
ability of this so as to avoid compromising relatives at home in Poland, and in r882 
Rakowski regarded the publicity given to his role in the reporting of the Russian 
threat as having gravely prejudiced his own claim to family estates in Poland.30 
He mentioned that a friend connected with the British Foreign Office had told him 
that there was not the slightest hope of his claims being recognized in view of this 
incident. 
According to the despatch of the Governor of Victoria31 to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, the news of the alleged Russian plans were received by the 
Colonial Treasurer, Mr. (later Sir George) Verdon, in July, r864, from Mr. Rakowski, 
through Mr. T. J. Sumner. According to a statement which, because of its contents 
and the matter in common with the Colonial Treasurer's memorandum, may be 
identified as that of Rakowski,32 in r882, Rakowski obtained his information from a 
" nephew". I have called him Zlyszuvski. According to Rakowski's statement, 
Lieutenant Zlyszuvski (let us call him X as a matter of historical humility) was held 
in high esteem by Popov and " enjoyed his confidence in an extraordinary degree". 
Rakowski had met Popov in Melbourne. The Admiral invited him to be his 
guest during the whole term of his stay in Victoria, but Rakowski paid a short visit 
and remarked later that the Admiral had received him "with marked courtesy". 
Popov apparently went from Australia to the East, and'Lieutenant X wrote to 
Rakowski from Shanghai on June 28, r863, " On our arrival here we found war had 
broken out. I went to the Admiral and told him I would like to retire. He answered 
, You ought to be Captain and not Lieutenant' and in two hours I was appointed 
Captain of the Amerika." The same night they sailed for Shanghai and Lieutenant X 
heard that the insurgents had made progress. "Feeling it was unbearable to wear 
Dr. F. B. Horner, Deputy Commonwealth Statistician in New South Wales, has provided the 
following figures. Unfortunately, the number of Poles is not shown separately in r86r. Some 
of the persons in" B " (compiled on basis of religion) will have also been counted in" A " (compiled 
on the basis of country of birth). 
1861 A B 
Richmond 22 persons born in Europe outside British Isles, France, 47 Jews 
Germany, or Austria 
Melbourne 394 r,r75 
Victoria 6,938 2,903 
1871 
Richmond 53 50 
Melbourne 49r r,486 
Victoria 6,206 3,57r 
The figure of 2r4 Poles in Victoria in r87r compares with 6 in Tasmania; in South Australia, 
Western Australia (r870), Queensland and New South Wales the number of Poles is not recorded 
in either the r86r or r87r figures. When it is recalled that the total population was slightly 
over half a million in r86r and slightly under three-quarters of a million ten years later, it will be 
clear that in these two census years there was in Victoria an extremely small proportion of the 
inhabitants which might have consisted of Poles. 
RUSSIAN PLANS FOR INVASION OF AUSTRALIA, I864 49 
a Muscovite uniform while my countrymen were fighting against Russia I went at 
once to the Admiral and told him that an honourable Pole ought not to serve Russia 
while his country was bleeding and begged him to grant me my discharge. Noble-
hearted Popoff (sic) heard my pleading with tears and thanked me for my sincerity 
but instead of acceding to my request he offered me further advancement. True, 
as a Muscovite he did not understand my duty to my country and inflicted fresh 
wounds on my heart." 
In a very interesting article published in I9I5, F. A. Golder,33 using the Arkiv 
Morskogo Ministerstva, Dielo, Kantseliarri Morskogo Ministerstva No. 99I, Part I, 
otherwise known as the A.M.M.D.K.M.M., the Archives of the Russian Ministry of 
Marines, noticed that General Adjutant Krabbe, who directed the Russian Navy, 
wrote to Popov, in April, I863, of the critical situation in Europe and warned him to 
be ready at any moment to attack the enemy. This letter came to Popov's hands, 
as Golder states (without reference to its journey), rather obliquely on July 20, while 
Gregg, one of the officers of the Russian Admiralty, notified him on June 3 that the 
news of declaration of war would be telegraphed to him to Omsk, whence a courier 
would take it to Tientsin by way of Pekin. It was in July, I863, that Lieutenant X 
was ordered to go with his vessel to Japan, where, since Popov did not accompany 
him, he was Chief to the Station, and he received a despatch there addressed to Popov 
or the Senior Officer in Command.34 
These documents stated that the Western powers had taken a part of Poland 
and the Squadron should be made ready for fighting. It may be that this Krabbe 
despatch is the one Rakowski refers to in his account. X, according to Rakowski, 
decided that he could not fight against the supporting powers and he re-sealed the 
despatches, forwarded them to Popov and then deserted, sailing on an American 
steamer, leaving the next senior officer in command. He was then introduced to a 
Polish Jew, received money to carry him on, together with an outfit-and apparently 
wrote to his " uncle" in March, I864, the letter reaching him in May. Rakowski 
said that he had no doubt that Lieutenant X forwarded this information to him 
in order that he might use it to place the colonial authorities on their guard and, 
speaking eighteen years later, he said,35 " On receipt of my nephew's letter, I consulted 
Mr. Sumner of Messrs. Grice Sumner and Company, who advised me to make any 
communication in the presence of Sir George, then Mr. Verdon, then the Treasurer 
of the Colony". It is possible that it was to this Lieutenant X that the Age, in 
a leading article on November 27, I863, referred when it mentioned that the First 
Lieutenant of the Russian frigate, Bogatyr, flung up his commission and favourable 
professional prospects to bear a hand in his country's battle, and this might be settled 
by reference to the Russian Navy List when I am able to do this.36 According to the 
Marlborough 0- Donnelly Daily Advertiser,37 Captain X found his way to Europe and 
was heard of in Paris, and in November, I864, was said to be in the service of Spain. 
The memorandum of the Colonial Treasurer,38 enclosed in one of the despatches 
from the Governor to the Secretary of State, reveals that Mr. Verdon was told by 
Mr. Sumner that the agent of the Polish National Government, Mr. Rakowski, gave 
D 
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him infonnation affecting the safety of the colony. Rakowski showed Sumner papers 
from the Polish National Government, and Sumner appeared to be satisfied of the 
genuineness of the documents. One paper was not signed but sealed with a stamp 
said to be the Government's seal. One of these documents apparently was Rakowski's 
appointment as an agent, dated from Warsaw, February 12, sealed but not signed, 
and one was a letter from Palmero dated March 10, received on May 12, giving the 
news in regard to the likely outbreak of war and the plans for the Russian ships. 
Rakowski, in Mayor June, informed either Verdon or Sumner that his information 
was obtained from Polish spies employed in " Russian public offices", which could 
have been a deliberately vague description of an officer's service in a ship of the 
Russian Navy. Verdon met Rakowski at Sumner's office in Sumner's presence.39 
Rakowski was sufficiently well known in Melbourne to render it, in the opinion 
of the Governor, Sir Charles Darling, impossible to regard his information as 
unfounded, although both at the time and according to his later recollections, which 
he admitted to be imperfect, Verdon, one of his advisers, was at first sceptical of the 
information. 40 In his letters to the Governors of New South Wales, Tasmania, New 
Zealand, South Australia and Queensland, Sir Charles Darling referred to " a Polish 
gentleman for some years resident in Melbourne, who is sufficiently well known in 
the community to justify the belief that the communication he has made is not 
without foundation". Darling also wrote that " it was impossible to disregard this 
information as the projects attributed to Russia appeared to be both probable and 
feasible ".41 The communication from Rakowski to Verdon may have been the more 
convincing because it was made through the eminently respectable Theodates John 
Sumner,42 a colonist of many years' standing, who had entered a partnership in a 
mercantile firm with Richard Grice, the ancestor of Sir Richard Grice, the member 
of the Council of the University of Melbourne. Sumner was sometime a Vice-President 
of the Melbourne Philharmonic Society, a President of the Port Phillip Fanners' 
Society, President of the Agricultural Society of Victoria, a Trustee of the Victorian 
Savings Bank-an established man with public responsibilities. We do not know 
why Rakowski confided in Sumner. Perhaps they were friends; they might have 
developed common interests from their fanning activities. Sumner may have had 
some Polish blood. Certainly he was an active sympathizer of Poland. We have 
seen that at the meeting in August, 1863, he had been appointed Treasurer of the 
Committee which was referred to as the English Committee, although he had sent an 
apology for being unable to attend it. His donation of ten guineas was one of the 
earliest subscriptions. 43 Sumner" said that certain communications had been made 
to him by Mr. Rakowski when acting as Treasurer to the Committee of the Polish 
Relief Fund". This clumsy syntax obscures the fact that Sumner, not Rakowski, 
was Treasurer. 
If Rakowski was in life an Anglican, Sumner was a leading member of the 
Wesleyan body, so there cannot have been the bond of common religious worship. 
The Governor almost immediately communicated with the Governors of the other 
colonies and the Military Commander, sent a letter to the Commodore in charge of the 
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Australian Station and sent confidential military and confidential despatches later in 
the month to the Colonial Office, enclosing these local communications. 44 The 
Colonial Office received the confidential and confidential military despatches in 
September,45 just before the date on which The Times published its editorial. They 
were forwarded to the War Office, to the Admiralty and to the Foreign Office, but I 
am informed that there are in the obvious accessible places no notations or documents 
which suggest that the matter was followed up with the Embassy at St. Petersburg. 48 
By now, of course, the tension between England and Russia was over and there may 
have been no point in pursuing the exact facts very vigorously. The Governor of 
Victoria had thought that some communication such as Verdon had received would 
have been made to the United Kingdom Government, although he remarked that in 
Rakowski's view this would not have been so, that it would have been thought suffi-
cient to warn the local authorities. Judging by his 1882 statement, Rakowski would 
himself have been most unwilling to have divulged the information publicly to The 
Times in a way which would have drawn attention to his own part in the revelations, 
and it may be interesting that The Times report did not reveal the process by which 
the information had been obtained, although in many other respects it bore very close 
resemblance to the Verdon memorandum enclosed in one of the despatches from 
Governor Darling to the Colonial Office. Perhaps in 1864 there might have appeared 
to be some tactical reason connected with the Polish-Russian dispute why this 
information should have been made publicly available to the English people by one 
connected with the Polish National Government, but it seems quite possible that the 
Poles would have shared Rakowski's fears of reprisals. 47 
There was hardly any time between the arrival at the Colonial Office of the 
despatches of Sir Charles Darling, to which I have referred, and the publication of the 
news in The Times; certainly not enough, as we know, for them to be minuted by 
the various levels of Colonial Office officials. But we know the Prime Minister's 
personal interest, and it is not unreasonable, perhaps, to think that even if Palmerston 
himself did not hear about it quickly (and perhaps he told Delane over dinner) some 
comparatively junior officer might have appreciated its interest. But if he did, he 
would have had to act quickly for The Times to publish it the next day. 
This perhaps might have been the more likely if the Colonial Office had shared 
The Times's desire to point the moral to the colony, but there is no evidence that it did, 
either in the particular notations on the incoming despatches or in the replies to them. 
The Times angered the Argus by using the incident as a lesson. 48 Referring to 
the colonial threats to consider separation if convicts continued to be sent to Western 
Australia, The Times pointed out that, while they were colonies, none could attack 
them without bringing upon themselves the whole power of England, but once they 
separated this would not be so. The Herald appreciated this argument, but the 
Argus pointed out, and both elements are to be found in subsequent colonial discussion, 
that the argument could be turned and, in fact, The Times had expected this. There 
was, of course, very little sustained active separatist feeling in the colonies, very little 
support for the view taken by Dr. Lang, which was, roughly, that the Australian 
colonies would be an unattractive target if they were separated. 
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.. The Times ", wrote the Argus, "makes a most daring experiment upon the 
ignorance and stupidity of Australians when it professes to believe that our best 
security for the cupidity and violence of the European nations lies in our connexion 
with England. It is more than puerile even to suggest that any European power 
having the power to do us an injury would attack us if we were independent, simply 
for the sake of plunder or out of love of violence." 
" ... It is really too bad that we should be expected to take charge of British 
criminals for no better reason than this, that we might otherwise possibly receive 
worse injury from some other sort of people ... It is in virtue of our character as 
British colonists that we seek protection from both the epauletted warriors of Europe 
and the trained felonry of England." 
This raised two issues. Some, such as Lord Grey, conceived the colonial relation-
ship, insofar as he nailed it down to close calculation, as protection on the part of the 
Mother Country and obedience on the part of the colonies. Others, such as John 
Robert Godley and Robert Lowe, believed that the involvement of the colony in the 
consequences of the Mother Country's foreign policy provided the main-in the case 
of Godley, the only-reason for the Mother Country's assuming the responsibility of 
protection. 49 
If England could provide the protection in this case, the crude argument, which 
ignored trade and sentiment alike, sometimes went, why need the colonies be concerned 
about the Russians; if not, why should we obediently take British convicts in 
gratitude? 50 During the period, Colonial and Imperial statesmen alike were gradually 
feeling their way into a different colonial relationship. As the colonies assumed a 
greater degree of self-government, obedience seemed less likely in fiscal policy and 
elsewhere, and the obligations of self-government included self-defence and self-
reliance. As the colonists grew aware of both the attempts by Britain in the 'fifties 
and 'sixties to reduce military expenditure, and of the views of the anti-imperialists 
and the Manchester School, they were wondering what was the content of the colonial 
relationship. Given responsible government, given English control over foreign 
policy, was this imperial relationship meaningful if it were defined in terms of being 
protected, or if not so defined, did the advantages of being defended outweigh other 
factors? 
In this case, the question was whether the naval ships which were still almost 
all an Imperial responsibility could have intercepted or defeated any attempts at 
attack, and if the enemy reached the coast, whether Imperial troops and volunteers 
could repulse them. 
By the eighteen sixties, the Australian colonies had responsibility for erecting 
their own fortifications. Attempts were made, however, carefully to preserve to the 
Imperial authorities command of troops as also the power to make peace or war, and 
the disposition of the Queen's ships. 51 
Victoria led the other Australian colonies, and, in fact, most British colonies, 
in her willingness to make military contributions. 52 But the absence of a clear and 
present danger for very long, as well as the preoccupation with internal political and 
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economic growth, the absence of a peace-time military tradition, the existence in 
long-run perspective of a shortage of labour in the colony, all told against a state of 
effective preparation, and, whether the colonists were willing to admit it or not, they 
relied fundamentally on the long arm of British sea power. Perhaps sometimes 
there were misgivings as to the value of fortifications, and differences of opinion 
on technical matters which reinforced the factors making for inertia. Almost 
whenever the possible danger was discussed, it was the quick raiding and plundering 
expedition that was feared, rather than the sustained occupation. 
Her Majesty's ships under Commodore Wiseman included Esk, Harrier, Miranda 
and Curacoa, not mustering more than seventy or eighty guns, and sometimes occupied 
in New Zealand and patrolling in the Pacific, against a total of eleven ships with 217 
guns in all, mentioned in the Verdon memorandum. 53 Commodore Wiseman 
proposed that his squadron be reinforced if their Lordships of the Admiralty considered 
the information reliable. His comments were not over-sanguine: "\Vith the present 
very small force under my command ... I could do little but endeavour to meet and 
cripple the enemy's squadrons before they could reach Port Phillip."54 
The Governor, writing to Wiseman, had not been over-confident of what would 
happen if the ships reached the coast: " ... we are absolutely without the means of 
preventing a hostile Naval Force from occupying Pt. Phillip and from shelling 
Melbourne." 55 
The Victorian Government's vessel, H.M.C.V. Victoria, which carried out survey 
work and served in New Zealand, was not a very significant addition to the British 
sea force, but she did illustrate a most important tendency in colonial defence, being 
the rudiments of a colonial navy. This little navy stimulated the discussion in 
Whitehall which preceded the drafting and enactment of the Colonial Naval Defence 
Act of r865, which attempted to provide the basis for colonial navies. 56 
The basic problem was twofold: to stimulate the growth of colonial self-reliance 
and to transfer some of the cost from the Imperial to the Colonial Exchequers and yet 
to maintain the Crown's control of the sea forces. Their Lordships argued with an 
impressive literary exactness as well as with dignified humour that a naval ship was 
an " erratic body". When and where the naval force should be employed to protect 
the colonies must depend on circumstances and must be left to the unfettered discretion 
of the naval commanders. The very naturalness of the wish of the colonies to maintain 
ships near them was appreciated by the Commissioners but regarded as a complication. 
The difficulties of the colonial navy within the Imperial connexion seemed to be 
the influence of a very democratic legislature, and destruction of an imperial link, the 
implication on the other hand of a desire for a voice in general policy. There were 
legal problems such as the absence of Imperial legislation authorizing the Royal 
assent to colonial legislation, the status in international law, the difficulties if " the 
half-civilized governments of South America" or "even our kindred in North 
America" asked for reciprocal recognition. The r865 Act does not seem to have 
been very successful. In the eighteen eighties the cost of the Australian Commands 
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was shared, and after federation, in an age when the bonds of empire were looser 
but still there, the dominion created its own navy. 
In 1864 there were still, as there were to be for six more years, some of Her 
Majesty's land forces in Australia. By this time a system of joint colonial and 
Imperial contribution was being evolved. The New Zealand campaign, which, with 
Canadian fiscal protection and the South African problem, was to add weight to 
thought in England which was opposed to garrisons abroad, had, however, depleted 
these troops and there was reliance on the local Volunteer Force for guard duties. 
The first Volunteer Movement, which flourished at the time of the Crimean 
War, languished with peace, and the second Volunteer Movement of the eighteen 
sixties followed the English movement and reflected the concern over relations with 
the French. It arose spontaneously and was accepted and supported by Government 
with varying vigour. In the Volunteer Movement is the origin of the modern 
Australian Army. Its story reflects many of the facets of colonial life. The Governor-
General rightly defended57 the movement against the charge of playing soldiers, but 
the activity of the Volunteers had to confront the lack of preparation in fortification, 
and scarcity of equipment, and parsimonious financial support, in fact, most of the 
factors affecting Australian defence generally. 
The administration of the Volunteers and the discussions 58 over the role of the 
Governor vis-a.-vis his responsible advisers and the officer commanding these forces 
show again the desire on the part of the imperial authorities to encourage colonial 
effort on the one hand and to preserve one of the prerogative powers of the Crown on 
the other, and also show colonial sensitivity over questions of control, especially 
where the colony contributed to the cost for supplying the men. 
There would be little point in discussing very fully the extent of preparedness 
for the invasion which did not take place. The Commodore's inspection of forti-
fications was brought forward and there were signs of activity among the various 
colonial governments, though it should be remembered that colonial officials already 
knew the Polish imbroglio was no longer active, however depressing was the general 
international scene. 59 
The question remains against what was the activity directed? I have not yet 
been able to pursue some inquiries concerning Lieutenant X and Rakowski that 
would bear on the authenticity of their story, but this story seems quite consistent 
with Russian activity and policy. If the Governor was right about Bogatyr and the 
Argus was right about the spying of a Russian count in Australia after the Crimean 
War, these do not make it less likely. Joyneville60 mentions the Russian plan very 
briefly in his biography of Alexander II. One might find confirmation if one could 
examine the basis of the material of Golder's work. Golder, who is now dead, was 
concerned with Russia and the American civil war, and his treatment of Russian 
archival material does not explicitly mention Australian ports; but there is the 
instruction from Grand Duke Constantine, in charge of the Russian Admiralty, to 
Popov to use his stronger ships to destroy the enemy's commerce in the event of war; 
there is the concern lest the Russian fleet be blockaded in port; the concern that 
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proper advantage be taken of a diplomatic situation between Russia and the Federal 
Government. We know the reaction of the United Kingdom Government to the 
plans for attacking British commerce. We know of the ignorance of these plans on 
the part of Brunow, the Russian Ambassador in London, and his concern when he 
discovered them. We know that the Russian Foreign Minister, Gortchokov, became 
opposed to the scheme and was resisted by its defender, General Adjutant Krabbe, 
who argued that England would not fight if her commerce was in danger, and that a 
few Russian guns in the ocean would have more influence on England than a much 
larger number in Sebastopol. We know that Alexander II attached considerable 
importance to the American aspect of the cruise.* 
The alleged plans do not seem inconsistent with an idea which might be favoured 
by the Muscovite of a sharp, vivid, exciting attack, and a demoralizing one, on the 
opposing empire, through its wool and its gold colonies isolated in the Antipodes. 
Whatever the Czarist Archives contain, the incident does show the involvement of 
the Antipodes in the affairs of Europe, the interest of Russia in the Pacific, the concern 
in Australia at oppression. The revelation came in a manner that is not unworthy 
of Buchan or Oppenheim, but that is now, alas, part of our common daily experience. 
There is some interest in the integrity of the characters-in Rakowski risking such 
security as he had in the present and such expectations as he had in the future, to 
help Poland and to pass on the information in a loyalty to his country, which he had 
left three decades earlier; in Lieutenant Zlyszuvski and Popov in their mutual respect 
and friendship which emerges in spite of the roles of antagonism for which their 
countries' situations cast them. There is some interest in this for a world in which we 
seek the meaning of treason and in which we seek to preserve in mass society the 
dignity of human relationships. 
* There is also the statement by Verdon in r882 (although he admitt('d his recollections 
might not be exact) that an officer of the British Admiralty had told him that at about the time 
Verdon mentioned, «the Russian squadron had suddenly left ~ew York without taking leave of 
their friends on board the English ship with whom they had been on friendly terms up to that 
time, or announcing the object of their departure or whither they were going". Age, 30th March, 
r882. It is not certain that this was the squadron to which the raid had been entrusted. 
In his communication to Wiseman, Darling referred to a similar report of the slipping away 
of Russian ships from Japan, but the Verdon memorandum mentioned only one ship from 
Japan which was to attack Australia. There is a rough correspondence in the names of ships 
mentioned by Golder and Verdon, allowing for different spellings and errors of transcription. 
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